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Abstract
Sample collection procedures and primary receptacle (sample container and bag) decontamination 
methods should prevent contaminant transfer between contaminated and non-contaminated 
surfaces and areas during bio-incident operations. Cross-contamination of personnel, equipment, 
or sample containers may result in the exfiltration of biological agent from the exclusion (hot) 
zone and have unintended negative consequences on response resources, activities and outcomes. 
The current study was designed to: (1) evaluate currently recommended sample collection and 
packaging procedures to identify procedural steps that may increase the likelihood of spore 
exfiltration or contaminant transfer; (2) evaluate the efficacy of currently recommended primary 
receptacle decontamination procedures; and (3) evaluate the efficacy of outer packaging 
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decontamination methods. Wet- and dry-deposited fluorescent tracer powder was used in 
contaminant transfer tests to qualitatively evaluate the currently-recommended sample collection 
procedures. Bacillus atrophaeus spores, a surrogate for Bacillus anthracis, were used to evaluate 
the efficacy of spray- and wipe-based decontamination procedures. Both decontamination 
procedures were quantitatively evaluated on three types of sample packaging materials (corrugated 
fiberboard, polystyrene foam, and polyethylene plastic), and two contamination mechanisms (wet 
or dry inoculums). Contaminant transfer results suggested that size-appropriate gloves should be 
worn by personnel, templates should not be taped to or removed from surfaces, and primary 
receptacles should be selected carefully. The decontamination tests indicated that wipe-based 
decontamination procedures may be more effective than spray-based procedures; efficacy was not 
influenced by material type but was affected by the inoculation method. Incomplete surface 
decontamination was observed in all tests with dry inoculums. This study provides a foundation 
for optimizing current B. anthracis response procedures to minimize contaminant exfiltration.
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Introduction
In late 2001, several letters containing spores of Bacillus anthracis, the etiological agent of 
anthrax, were distributed through the U.S. mail system. As a direct result, 22 people 
developed either cutaneous (N = 11) or inhalation (N = 11) anthrax; 5 of those with 
inhalation anthrax died. In addition, a number of buildings were contaminated and 
emergency response activities were conducted in numerous locations.[1–6] This process took 
several years to complete. Remediation costs following the “Amerithrax” incident were 
estimated at $320 million,[7] and the total cost of the incident, excluding economic impacts, 
was estimated at over $1 billion.[8,9]
Approximately 120,000 environmental samples were collected during the response to this 
incident.[7,10] Numerous samples collected from areas, or assets, outside the zone of primary 
contamination showed that the spores readily escaped the exclusion zone (i.e., hot zone or 
contaminated area). Exfiltration of spores potentially occurred via reaerosolization and 
airborne transport, transport on responder personnel, or insufficient decontamination 
procedures for items transported out of the exclusion zone such as personal protective 
equipment (PPE), equipment, or environmental sample containers.[11] The suspected case of 
cutaneous anthrax acquired by a laboratory worker who was processing Amerithrax samples 
also demonstrated the risks of handling samples associated with B. anthracis.[12]
In the years following the 2001 anthrax incident, numerous studies have been conducted to 
understand efficiencies of sampling procedures for spore collection from environmental 
matrices.[13–22] However, few studies have focused on the vulnerabilities of the field-
collection procedures, particularly with regard to their potential for facilitating exfiltration of 
contaminants from the exclusion (hot) zone thereby contaminating assets not previously 
contaminated.[23] Two administrative controls used to prevent or reduce contaminant 
Calfee et al. Page 2
J Occup Environ Hyg. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 December 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
exfiltration from the exclusion zone are: (1) the use of vetted and standardized sample 
collection procedures which include the use of a two-person team: a support person that 
does not come into contact with potentially contaminated surfaces to be sampled and a 
sampler that collects the sample from a potentially contaminated surface; and (2) 
implementation of primary receptacle decontamination procedures prior to removal from the 
exclusion zone and outer packaging decontamination upon arrival at the receiving 
laboratory. Determining the vulnerabilities in the current procedures is imperative so that 
refinements, if necessary, can be made to the procedures to reduce the risk of cross-
contamination and exfiltration.
The International Air Transport Association’s (IATA) Dangerous Goods Regulations specify 
packaging for infectious substances affecting humans (UN 2814). Packaging must include 
an inner packaging comprised of a leak-proof primary receptacle (the sample container), a 
leak proof secondary packaging with absorbent material (for other than solid infectious 
substances), and a rigid outer packaging. Following the CDC protocol and historical 
practices, this translates into a primary receptacle consisting of a specimen cup and a 
resealable polyethylene plastic bag and an outer packaging of a polystyrene foam insulation 
inside a fiberboard box.
Decontamination of the sample container is recommended by the CDC in the contamination 
reduction (warm) zone when samples are removed from the exclusion zone. Secondary and 
outer packaging should not enter the exclusion or contamination reduction zones. The 
secondary and outer packaging should only be handled in a known clean environment and 
environmental samples should only be packaged after they have been properly 
decontaminated.
The objectives of the current study were to evaluate current biological sample collection and 
packaging procedures for potential sources of cross-contamination, and to determine the 
effectiveness of sample packaging (primary receptacle and outer packaging) 
decontamination procedures. Cross-contamination during sample collection was evaluated 
with dry- or liquid-deposited fluorescent tracer powder, using sample collection procedures 
recommended by CDC or the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).[14,24–26] 
Primary receptacle packaging decontamination procedures recommended by CDC[26] and 
utilized by EPA[24] were evaluated on relevant packaging materials that were experimentally 
contaminated with B. atrophaeus spores by either liquid droplet or dry aerosol inoculation. 
Because of the concern that outer packaging may become contaminated when shipped 
during a response to a wide area release, this study also looked at the possibility outer 
packaging could be decontaminated by the receiving laboratory following the same methods. 
The findings of this study can be used to optimize field sample collection, packaging, and 
laboratory receiving procedures to reduce the risk of cross-contamination during future B. 
anthracis response activities.
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Materials and methods
Contaminant transfer tests
To qualitatively assess the potential for contaminant transfer from contaminated surfaces to 
sampling personnel and onto sample packaging materials, a long wave UV fluorescing 
melamine tracer powder (Risk Reactor, P/N PXT-07, Santa Ana, CA) in the size range of 5–
15 μm was used as a B. anthracis spore simulant. Simulant was deposited onto slate 
laboratory bench material in a chemical fume hood by both dry and wet methods during 
separate tests. Dry deposition was accomplished using a bellows type pesticide powder 
duster (Southern Homewares, P/N 818947013256). To deposit the powder, the duster was 
inverted and the bulb squeezed, releasing about 0.020 g (determined gravimetrically) of 
powdered fluorescent tracer per actuation. For each test with dry tracer powder, the duster 
was actuated into an inverted plastic storage container ten times over an exposed surface 
area of approximately 2412 cm2, resulting in an estimated surface concentration of about 
0.082 mg/cm2. For wet deposition, the tracer powder was suspended in 100 mL of 100% 
ethanol in a small plastic spray bottle that released about 0.019 g (determined 
gravimetrically) of tracer powder per sprayer actuation. For each test with wet tracer powder, 
the sprayer was actuated ten times into the same plastic storage container used for dry 
deposition over the same surface area, resulting in an estimated surface concentration of 
about 0.079 mg/cm2. Wet or dry tracer powder was deposited and allowed to dry 
(approximately 10 min) or settle (approximately 10 min), respectively. For all wet and dry 
powder tests, a 645 cm2 area in the center of the 2412 cm2 area where powder was deposited 
was designated for performing the surface sample collection procedure (Figure 1). The area 
that received tracer powder was considerably (3.7 times) larger than the area designated for 
sampling in order to model sample collection in the hot zone, where contaminants are not 
visible to the sampler and thus may extend beyond the sample collection template. Surface 
samples were collected with 3M Sponge-Sticks using the procedures described 
previously[13,14,18] (Figure 2). Video and photography under visible or long-wave ultraviolet 
light were used to document procedural steps in which gloves came in contact with 
contaminated surfaces and to assess contaminant (tracer powder) transfer following 
execution of each sampling procedure.
The test matrix was designed to evaluate each procedural variation that differ between the 
CDC NIOSH website-published method,[26] the CDC NIOSH video published online,[25] 
and a recent inter-agency (EPA, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense) 
field test (Bio-Response Operational Testing and Evaluation; BOTE) sampling plan.[24] 
These differences include glove size (extra-large versus size appropriate), securing the 
sampling template with tape or holding it in place with one hand during sampling, and 
removing the template following the completion of sampling (EPA method), or leaving it in 
place (CDC method). These procedural differences are captured in the experimental plan 
(Table 1), and were varied in the current study as independent variables.
More specifically, over an existing pair of appropriately sized gloves, the sampler donned 
either extra-large nitrile gloves (EPA method) or large (size-appropriate for the sampler) 
nitrile gloves (CDC method), depending upon the test under study. A 10″ × 10″ paper 
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sampling template was placed on the contaminated surface by the sampler and either taped 
down on two sides (CDC method), or left un-taped (EPA method for horizontal surfaces), as 
indicated in the test matrix. The area inside the template was then sampled with a 3M 
Sponge-Sticks according to the standardized CDC protocol. After sampling, the tip of the 
3M Sponge-Stick was broken off by the sampler into a plastic specimen cup (Starplex 120 
mL specimen cup, P/N 14-375-459, Fisher Scientific (straight walls); or VWR 133 mL 
specimen cup, P/N 25384-144 (tapered walls)) held by the support person. The sampler was 
right handed. When the template was taped down, the sampler did not touch the template 
with their left hand, however when no tape was used to secure the template, the sampler held 
the template in position with at least two fingers of their left hand during sampling (Figures 
3E and 3F).
After each step in the sampling process, the sampler’s gloved hands were placed in a light 
box and exposed to long wave UV light. Contamination on the sampler’s gloves was 
documented with an HD video camera (Sam-sung HMX-F90) and a HD digital camera 
(Pentax K20). Pictures were also taken under normal light conditions to show where in the 
sampling process cross contamination may occur. The amount of cross contamination was 
not quantified, however, the magnitude of contamination was often apparent.
To assess the potential for contaminant transfer from contaminated support personnel to the 
primary receptacle, both extra-large and large gloves were intentionally contaminated (by 
touching glove fingertips to a surface laden with tracer powder) before executing the post-
collection sample packaging procedures. While sample collection procedures, if followed 
explicitly, should preclude the possibility of the support personnel’s gloves becoming 
contaminated, working in a contaminated zone often yields unforeseen circumstances. To 
this end, we sought to understand the potential consequences of the support person 
becoming contaminated and subsequently handling sample packaging materials. During 
these tests, specimen cups were capped, covered with Parafilm and packaged in plastic bags 
(the primary receptacle) as prescribed in the CDC protocol.[25]
Bacterial spore preparations and inoculation methods
Both liquid and dry (aerosolized) preparations of B. atrophaeus (American Type Culture 
Collection (ATCC) 9372; formerly Bacillus subtilis var niger and Bacillus globigii) were 
used as a surrogate for B. anthracis. Wet and dry inoculation methods represent two 
contamination scenarios that may occur during a biological incident. Liquid spore 
preparations were obtained from Yakibou, Inc. (formerly Apex Laboratories) in deionized 
water at a concentration of about 6 × 108 colony forming units (CFU) per mL and were 
diluted with 10% ethanol (v/v) to a concentration of about 4 × 105 CFU per mL for 
inoculation onto test materials. Dry spores were obtained from the U.S. Army’s Dugway 
Proving Grounds and were prepared[21,27] before being loaded into pressurized metered dose 
inhalers (MDIs) by Cirrus Pharmaceuticals (Durham, NC) as reported previously.[28] The 
MDIs delivered a concentration of approximately 2 × 107 spores per 50 μL actuation.
For dry deposition tests, the center-most 929 cm2 portion of clean, dry, sterile materials were 
inoculated with aerosolized B. atrophaeus spores using procedures described previously.[28] 
Briefly, the MDI was loaded into an aluminum actuator positioned above the test material 
Calfee et al. Page 5
J Occup Environ Hyg. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 December 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
coupon at the top of a sealed pyramid-shaped chamber and actuated once to release the 
aerosolized spores. Following release, test material coupons remained sealed and 
undisturbed for 18–21 hr to allow gravitational settling of the spore inoculum. For wet spore 
inoculations, 1 mL of the liquid inoculum was deposited onto material coupons as a series of 
ten 100 μL droplets using a micropipette. The inoculum was allowed to dry 18–21 hr prior to 
test treatment initiation. This inoculation method is similar to those described 
previously.[14,18] The targeted recovery from positive controls was 2 × 105 and 1 × 107 CFU 
for liquid and dry inoculums, respectively.
Sample package material decontamination tests
Sample package material decontamination tests were conducted to evaluate the efficacy of 
two currently-recommended decontamination methods, sporicidal wipe-based and sporicidal 
spray-based approaches.[24,26] Test materials consisted of 1264.5 cm2 pieces of corrugated 
fiberboard (outer packaging from Thermosafe EPS, P/N 352; Arlington Heights, IL), 
polystyrene foam (outer packaging insulating container from Thermosafe EPS, P/N 352; 
Arlington Heights, IL), and polyethylene plastic (primary receptacle [Ziplock 3 gallon bag] 
from S.C. Johnson & Son, P/N 255927, Racine, WI) (Figures 4A–C). Stainless steel (16-
gauge, 316 stainless; Dillon Supply, Raleigh, NC) coupons (Figure 4D) of the same size 
were used as positive control reference samples to verify inoculation procedures. Prior to 
inoculation, the stainless steel reference coupons were steam sterilized via autoclave at 
121°C while the packaging materials were sterilized with ethylene oxide, to maintain 
material integrity, according to manufacturer’s instructions (Anderson EO Gas AN333 
system, Haw River, NC).
The decontamination efficacy of sporicidal bleach wipes (Clorox Healthcare Bleach 
Germicidal Wipes) and pH adjusted bleach (PaB) spray-based decontamination procedures 
was investigated for both contamination methods (wet or dry inoculum), and all three test 
materials. Tests were conducted under ambient laboratory conditions, with the temperature 
and relative humidity monitored but not controlled (21–24°C; 25–55% RH). Five test 
replicates, three positive control replicates, and one blank were utilized for each combination 
of material type, decontaminant, and inoculation method.
For the sporicidal wipe decontamination tests, procedures were adapted from ASTM 
E2896-12,[29] as presented previously.[30] For each test replicate, bleach wipes were folded 
in half, then half again, and the coupon was first wiped in the horizontal direction, back and 
forth, until the entire surface had been wetted. Next, the wipe was folded in half again and 
the surface wiped in the vertical direction until the entire surface had been covered. Finally, 
the bleach wipe was folded a third time and the surface wiped diagonally beginning at the 
upper left corner.
For the spray-based decontamination procedure, PaB solutions were prepared daily by first 
diluting the bleach (Clorox Healthcare Concentrated Bleach) containing 8.25% sodium 
hypochlorite 2:1 with deionized (DI) water. The diluted bleach was then mixed with DI 
water and 5% (v/v) acetic acid (Fisher Scientific, P/N S25623A) to result in a ratio of 1:8:1 
(bleach:water:acetic acid), respectively, having a resulting pH of about 6.8 (confirmed with a 
pH meter) and a free available chlorine concentration of about 6530 mg/mL as measured 
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using a HACH digital titrator (Hach Company, P/N 26869-01, Ames, IA) loaded with 2.26 
N stabilized sodium thiosulfate. The solution was adjusted as necessary to obtain the target 
pH of 6.8. Following preparation, the PaB was transferred into a high density polyethylene 
hand sprayer (Flo-Master, Model 1985VI, Lowell, MI), pressurized to 5 psi by hand-
pumping, and sprayed onto horizontally oriented coupons from a distance of approximately 
30 cm for 5 s in a zig-zag pattern to fully wet the surface. Only one application of PaB was 
administered. Surfaces remained visibly wetted for at least 10 min, in accordance with CDC 
recommendations.[26] Surfaces were not mechanically dried with a towel as the CDC 
guidance is not prescriptive in the drying method.
Following both decontamination methods, coupons remained undisturbed for an average of 
21 hr to allow drying before sampling with pre-moistened 3M Sponge-Sticks (3M, St. Paul, 
MN, P/N SSL10NB) using the standardized CDC protocol for sampling nonporous 
surfaces.[14,18,26] Stainless steel reference coupons, positive control (non-decontaminated 
material coupons), and test coupons were all sampled using the CDC protocol, on the same 
day. B. atrophaeus spores were recovered from the 3M Sponge-Sticks using the procedures 
described in the CDC’s national validation study.[14] inoculated in triplicate onto trypticase 
soy agar with an Autoplate spiral plating system (Advanced Instruments, Inc.; Grove, IL) 
and incubated overnight at 35 ± 2°C. CFUs were then enumerated with a Q-Count 
automated colony counter (Advanced Instruments, Inc.). Negative controls and samples with 
fewer than 30 CFU per plate were filter-plated by collecting 1 mL and 9 mL of the sample 
extract onto Pall 0.45 μm pore-size microfunnel filters (P/N 4804). The filters were placed 
collection side up onto TSA plates, incubated overnight at 35 ± 2°C and then manually 
enumerated. Recovery data are reported as Log10 CFU, decontamination efficacy data are 
reported as Log Reduction in total recovery (Log10 positive controls – Log10 experimental), 
and were reduced as described previously.[31] Statistical significance was assessed using a p-
value threshold of 0.05.
Results
Contaminant transfer
The tracer powder was readily visible under long-wave ultraviolet light (Figure 1). 
Observation of hand positions relative to experimentally contaminated surfaces indicated 
that gloved hands have a high potential to contact surfaces during sampling procedures 
(Figure 3). The oversized gloves had a greater potential to contact the surface during 
sampling. Securing the sampling template to the surface can result in glove contamination, 
both from the act of taping and from holding the template in place during taping (Figures 3C 
through 3F). Not using tape to secure the template to the surface can result in contamination 
transfer to gloves during sampling. This was due to the need for one hand to hold the 
template in place during sample collection and therefore at higher risk of contacting the 
contaminated surface (Figures 3E and 3F). Irrespective of glove size, there is potential to 
cross contaminate sampling personnel during sponge head snap-off into the specimen cup 
(Figures 3I and 3J). Aerosolization of the wetting agent was observed in the current study 
during snap-off of the sponge head. This could result in external contamination of the 
specimen cup and other surfaces. This occurred most frequently when the sampler struggled 
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to break the sponge head from the stick. Trials with two different specimen cups (a straight 
side-wall cup and a tapered-wall cup) were conducted to determine if cup type affected this 
occurrence. From our qualitative observations, we concluded that tapered-wall specimen 
cups eased sponge head snap-off and thereby reduced the risk of wetting agent 
aerosolization during snap-off.
Observation of gloves following each procedure showed that template taping and template 
removal resulted in contaminant transfer from the surface to gloved fingers, for both dry and 
wet deposition methods (Figure 5). Tests in which the post-collection sample packaging 
procedures were conducted following purposeful contamination of the support person 
indicated that contaminants can be transferred to sample containers (Figure 6). There were 
no observed differences between wet and dry tracer deposition methods with respect to 
cross-contamination frequency or magnitude.
Sample package material decontamination tests
The results of the sample package material decontamination tests are shown in Table 2. 
Recoveries (mean ± std. dev) from positive control reference coupons were 5.5 ± 5.3 Log10 
CFU (3.5 ± 1.9 × 105 CFU) for tests with liquid inocula and 7.3 ± 7.0 Log10 CFU (2.2 ± 1.1 
× 107 CFU) for tests with aerosol inocula (Table 2). For the liquid inoculated test coupons, 
both decontamination methods were equally effective at reducing the spore loads. There was 
no statistically significant difference between decontamination methods (p = 0.383) or 
materials (p = 0.327) (t-test). Only one post-decontamination sample yielded viable spores 
during tests with liquid inoculums. Viable spores (2 CFU) were recovered from one of five 
replicates for the sporicidal wipe-decontaminated polyethylene plastic sample. For the 
aerosol deposition samples, none of the conditions tested yielded complete kill (i.e., viable 
spores were recovered following decontamination during all tests). For these tests there was 
a statistically significant difference (p < 0.001) between the sporicidal wipe and PaB spray 
decontamination methods, with the wipe achieving higher decontamination efficacies. For 
the tests utilizing the sporicidal bleach wipe decontamination method, the average post-
decontamination recoveries (log10 CFU) were, 1.6 ± 1.6, 1.7 ± 1.0, and 0.6 ± 1.2 for 
corrugated fiberboard, polystyrene foam, and polyethylene plastic, respectively. For the PaB 
spray-based decontamination method, the average post-decontamination recoveries (log10 
CFU) were, 4.4 ± 0.5, 4.8 ± 0.6, and 5.4 ± 0.2 for corrugated fiberboard, polystyrene foam, 
and polyethylene plastic, respectively.
Discussion
During past biological emergency response investigations, exfiltration of contaminants from 
the exclusion zone has been documented.[23,32] This can have serious consequences, 
including increasing sampling and decontamination requirements, increasing overall 
operation costs, and increasing the risk of exposure of unprotected workers or civilians. 
Current sample collection and primary receptacle decontamination procedures have been 
designed to optimize sample integrity while minimizing the risk of contaminant transfer 
from the exclusion zone to areas previously not contaminated. Proper laboratory practices 
and the use of biological safety cabinets during sample processing and analytical methods 
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also reduce the risk of laboratory contamination and worker exposure.[33] Nevertheless, few 
studies have systematically evaluated the two main administrative controls used to minimize 
cross-contamination: sample collection procedures and primary receptacle decontamination 
prior to removal from the exclusion zone. The current study utilized a systematic approach 
to evaluate the currently-recommended sample collection and primary receptacle 
decontamination procedures for cross-contamination potential, in order to improve these 
procedures. In addition, outer packaging materials were also tested following current 
decontamination recommendations to see if receiving laboratories can use the procedures in 
the event of suspected cross-contamination during shipment. Tests were also conducted to 
determine cross-contamination potential in the unlikely scenario in which the support 
person’s gloves become contaminated. For these tests, the support person’s gloves were 
intentionally contaminated with fluorescent tracers prior to executing sample collection and 
packaging procedures.
It has long been recognized that fomites (inanimate objects) can play a significant role in 
contaminant transfer and thus pathogen transmission.[34,35] Contaminants acquired by 
touching contaminated surfaces can be subsequently transferred to other surfaces or 
individuals.[34] Further, contaminants can be distributed and redistributed numerous times, 
as evidenced by a study on multi-generational contamination of letters containing Bacillus 
spores.[36] The magnitude of contaminant transfer is determined by many factors, including 
contaminant characteristics, surface characteristics, particle-surface interactions, 
contaminant load, barrier or PPE type, adherence to aseptic techniques, contact force or 
mechanism, and environmental conditions.[37–39] Although not quantitative in nature, the 
current study sought to identify steps within standardized procedures that may lead to 
downstream contamination of laboratories, assets, or previously uncontaminated areas. 
Identification of such vulnerabilities, with subsequent refinement in procedures, are essential 
for emergency response activities involving high-consequence pathogens such as B. 
anthracis spores. In the current study, fluorescent tracer powder was used during sample 
collection procedures to identify steps that may facilitate cross-contamination. Such tracers 
have been used in previous studies for qualitative identification of mechanisms and rates of 
cross-contamination.[40] The results of the current study offer insight into the procedural 
steps that pose the greatest potential for cross-contamination. Refinement of the most 
vulnerable steps may mitigate the risk of cross-contamination. However, it is important to 
note that only one type of fluorescent tracer powder was utilized in the current study, and 
that the physical characteristics of this tracer may be different than those of Bacillus spores. 
Others have shown that tracer selection can influence results and conclusions.[37,41] 
Nonetheless, tracers provide a simple means to rapidly identify procedural steps in which 
contaminants may be transferred. Since transfer of contaminants was by direct contact with 
contaminated surface, it is unlikely that another tracer powder would yield differing results.
In reviewing the photographic data from the current study, several procedural steps or 
practices were identified as potentially increasing the risk of cross-contamination. The 
prescribed use of extra-large gloves during sampling, without regard to sampling personnel’s 
hand size, may increase the potential for contamination of gloves and subsequently any item 
touched thereafter. Keen hand position awareness and secure fitting gloves (size appropriate 
for specific sampling personnel), increase dexterity and decrease the amount of glove 
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surface area available to contact contaminated surfaces. Pre-assembly of sampling kits prior 
to exclusion zone entry could be problematic as the hand size of sampling personnel is likely 
unknown at the time of kit assembly. Gloves could be packaged separately from supplies for 
sampling operations, and each individual could deploy with a size-appropriate supply of 
gloves.
Both securing the template with tape and not securing the template (requiring one hand to 
secure it while sampling) increased the risk of cross-contamination. Templates should be 
taped only when necessary, such as when sampling vertical surfaces. Adhering double-sided 
adhesive strips on the back of templates, prior to exclusion zone entry, may provide an easy 
means for securing templates without the use of tape, and relieve the sampler from needing 
to hold the template in place with a gloved hand. However, removal of the paper backing 
from adhesive strips while wearing gloves may prove difficult. Similarly, the CDC-
prescribed taping of the template (Figure 3) was challenging to execute while wearing 
gloves. Removal of templates after sampling procedures also poses unnecessary risks of 
cross-contamination. Templates should be left in-place until the area is determined safe for 
re-entry.
The type of specimen cup used may contribute to contamination transfer. During the current 
study, it was observed to be much easier and required less force to break off the 3M Sponge-
Stick tip if the walls of the specimen cup were sloped rather than perpendicular to the 
bottom of the cup. Struggling with tip removal post-collection could potentially generate 
aerosol droplets from the 3M Sponge-Sticks, or even result in dropped samples. Sample 
bags, such as whirl-pak or twirl-em, are commonly used as spill-proof containers for liquid 
samples and may allow ease of sponge head detachment compared to either of the specimen 
cup options. Shipping regulations for hazardous or infectious materials posted by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation and the International Air Transport Association should be 
reviewed prior to final selection of sample package and containment vessels.
Both wet and dry contamination mechanisms are possible during a B. anthracis incident, 
whether by the initial contaminant dispersion mechanism or by contaminant redistribution 
during sampling and decontamination activities. Accordingly, the current study evaluated the 
efficacy of decontamination methods against spores deposited by both wet (droplet) and dry 
(aerosol) mechanisms on three common sample packaging materials. The decontamination 
test results suggest that material type does not significantly affect efficacy, for the materials 
tested. Inoculation method and decontamination method (for the dry inoculum only) had 
more impact on efficacy than did material type for the materials included in this study. 
Previously, sporicidal wipes were shown to be effective on numerous material types, such as 
stainless steel, glass, composite epoxy, painted drywall, and low-density polyethylene 
plastic.[30]
Due to the significant difference between the liquid (105) and dry (107) inoculum titers, the 
authors urge caution when comparing decontamination efficacy results across inoculum 
types. In general, tests utilizing liquid inoculums resulted in higher decontamination 
efficacies than tests where the same methods were performed on surfaces receiving the dry 
inoculum. Indeed, other studies have noted that differences in decontamination efficacy can 
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been attributed to inoculation method.[42] Because liquid spores were deposited in ten 
discrete spots of 100 μL across a coupon in a predictable pattern rather than evenly 
distributed, it is possible that: (1) the location of contamination was known and therefore 
unintentionally targeted during the decontamination procedure; (2) physical removal of 
contaminants is more efficient when the liquid inoculum is dried into small, discrete 
locations rather than deposited as dry particles over the entire coupon surface; and (3) the 
actual amount of inoculated surface area was significantly smaller for liquid tests (the area 
under ten small droplets), and thus decontamination procedures had a much higher 
probability of treating 100% of the contaminated area. For example, if a small amount of 
coupon surface area was inadvertently neglected during the decontamination treatment, the 
impact on viable spore recovery could be much greater for the tests with dry inoculums. 
Liquid droplet contamination of sample packages is a realistic scenario in a field situation, 
possibly occurring following liquid spray decontamination procedures. In addition, 
contamination of sample packaging by liquid droplets could potentially occur during 
personnel and equipment decontamination line procedures, at the boundary between the 
exclusion and support zones. Liquid wash-down of equipment and personnel is a common 
decontamination line procedure during B. anthracis response operations. During such 
activities, contaminants may be redistributed by sprays, scrub-brushes, or runoff water.
Bleach wipes demonstrated higher decontamination efficacies than PaB spraying for 
aerosol-inoculated test coupons. This could be due to both the effectiveness of the 
decontaminant and the dual action of chemical inactivation and physical removal of spores 
during the wipe-based method. The contribution of physical removal, without spore 
inactivation, was not determined for the sporicidal wipe method during this study nor was 
the interaction between chemical and physical forces. This study did not look at the efficacy 
of the spray-based method used in conjunction with mechanical drying of the surface 
compared to air drying. It is unclear what contributions the physical removal provided 
through mechanical drying would have on the PaB spray-based method’s efficacy. 
Alternately, incomplete coverage of contaminated surfaces using the PaB spray method, 
could permit viable spores to survive decontamination treatment. Spore hydrophobicity may 
also affect spore movements with water and decontaminant (cluster during spray-based 
application), and these effects may differ between liquid and dry inoculums thereby 
contributing to disparities in decontamination efficacies. While further tests should be 
conducted to determine the effects of the contamination mechanism on decontamination 
efficacy, the current data suggest that wipe-based procedures for sample containers are 
superior to spray-based methods. These results corroborate previous studies that 
demonstrated the effectiveness of wipe-based surface decontamination approaches on steel, 
glass, composite epoxy, dry wall, and low-density polyethylene.[30,43] Wipe-based sample 
container decontamination procedures are also more feasible to conduct in restrictive 
protective gear, and take less time to execute. These factors (time and ease of use) weigh 
heavily on method selection for real-world response operations.
Conclusions
The current study sought to gain an understanding of cross-contamination potential when 
using the currently-recommended sample collection procedures, primary receptacle 
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decontamination procedures, and the potential for outer packaging decontamination at the 
receiving laboratory. In addition, this study sought to understand cross-contamination from 
the unlikely event that the support person becomes contaminated during the sampling 
procedure. Evaluation and revision of these procedures is critical for ensuring sample 
integrity and preventing cross-contamination during sampling operations following a 
biological incident. The following conclusions can be drawn from the test results.
• Sporicidal wipe-based package decontamination procedures achieved 
higher decontamination efficacies than spray-based procedures (aerosol 
inoculum tests).
• Decontamination of dry-deposited spore inoculums was more difficult 
than wet-deposited spores (complete kill was not achieved during tests 
with dry-deposited spores).
• To ease sponge head snap-off, tapered-side specimen cups are preferred 
over straight-side specimen cups for 3M Sponge-Stick primary 
containment.
• Size-appropriate gloves resulted in less contaminant transfer by sampling 
and support personnel than extra-large gloves.
• It is suggested that templates be taped to the surface only if necessary, and 
remain in place after sampling.
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Figure 1. 
Representative photographs of surfaces where sampling procedures were rendered following 
wet deposition (A) or dry deposition (B) of fluorescent tracer powder. Fluorescent tracer 
powder was deposited onto 2412 cm2 section of a laboratory bench surface, a paper template 
demarcating a 645 cm2 area for sampling was subsequently placed in the center of that area. 
Panel C is a representative photograph of the area prior to tracer deposition. Photographs 
were taken under long-wave UV light.
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Figure 2. 
CDC standardized 3M Sponge-Sticks sampling procedure.
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Figure 3. 
Representative photographs of hand positions and potential cross-contamination points 
during sample collection with the 3M Sponge-Stick samplers. Photographs depict placement 
of the template where the sampler had donned extra-large (A) or size-appropriate gloves (B), 
taping the template to the surface using extra-large (C) or size-appropriate gloves (D), 
holding the template during sampling using extra-large (E) or size-appropriate gloves (F), 
conducting the sample collection procedure using extra-large (G) or size-appropriate gloves 
(H), and breaking the sponge collection head into the specimen cup using extra-large (I), or 
size-appropriate gloves (J).
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Figure 4. 
Photograph of representative coupons utilized during sample package material 
decontamination tests. Coupons consisted of corrugated fiberboard (A), polystyrene foam 
(B), both 35.6 cm × 35.6 cm, or polyethylene plastic bags (C). Stainless steel coupons (D) 
were utilized as inoculation controls.
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Figure 5. 
Representative photographs of glove contamination resulting during 3M Sponge-Stick 
sampling procedures. Photos depict contamination on glove fingertips following dry-
deposition sampling with extra-large gloves (A), contamination on extra-large glove finger-
tips following taping of the template (dry deposition) (B), contamination on size-appropriate 
glove fingertips following template removal (dry deposition) (C), and contamination on size-
appropriate glove fingers following template removal (wet deposition) (D).
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Figure 6. 
Representative photographs of cross-contamination resulting from the contamination of the 
support person during packaging of 3M Sponge-Sticks. Gloves were purposefully 
contaminated prior to beginning the packaging procedure to determine the potential for 
contamination of sample containers. Photos depict contamination on glove fingertips 
following purposeful contamination while wearing extra-large gloves (A), contamination on 
size-appropriate glove fingertips (B), contamination specimen cups following closure with 
extra-large gloves (C), and size-appropriate gloves (D).
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Table 1
Summary of contaminant transfer test variables. Tracer powder was deposited onto a larger area (2412 cm2) 
from which surface samples (645 cm2) were collected. Tests were conducted with either wet- or dry-deposited 
powder in order to simulate two differing contamination scenarios. Steps that differed between the EPA and 
CDC procedures were varied in the eight tests conducted to determine the effect on cross-contamination of 
gloves and sample containers.
Test Deposition Gloves Template Template Removal
1 Dry Extra Large, Powder Free, Nitrile Taped Not removed
Removed & disposed
2 Not Taped Not removed
Removed & disposeda
3 Large, Powder Free, Nitrile Taped Not removedb
Removed & disposed
4 Not Taped Not removed
Removed & disposed
5 Wet Extra Large, Powder Free, Nitrile Taped Not removed
Removed & disposed
6 Not Taped Not removed
Removed & disposeda
7 Large, Powder Free, Nitrile Taped Not removedb
Removed & disposed
8 Not Taped Not removed
Removed & disposed
a
EPA method.
bCDC method.
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